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The present research examined whether the environmental responsibility and actions attributed to large
scale organizations, such as the government, can inﬂuence people's environmental efforts. In particular,
we examined whether people increase or decrease their willingness to enact energy conservation be-
haviors (ECB) when there is a shortfall between others' actions and their responsibility. In Studies 1 and 2
we found that willingness to enact ECB was positively correlated with judgements about each of the
organizations' eco-responsibility but not their eco-actions. Interestingly, each of the organizations' ac-
tions were perceived as falling short of their responsibility and this shortfall was positively associated
with willingness to enact ECB. In Study 3, we found that manipulating respondents perceptions of
government shortfall increased participants' willingness to enact ECB. Overall our ﬁndings provide
support for social compensation theory as when others actions fall short of their responsibility people are
prepared to “go the extra green mile”.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Environmental campaigns and policy initiatives often attempt
to inﬂuence people's behaviors (DEFRA, 2008; Owens, 2000). For
example, a discussion paper from the UK cabinet ofﬁce argued that
in striving for green behaviors, “the eventual aim is to entrench a
habit of personal responsibility” (2004, p.5). However, while the
onus appears to be on individuals there are other key actors or
agents who also have a role to play in energy conservation such as
ﬁrms, communities, governments, and international organizations
(see Stern, 1992). Yet, to date, this wider social context has typically
been overlooked in psychological research. Consequently, it re-
mains to be seen if people's willingness to enact Energy Conser-
vation Behaviors (ECB) is inﬂuenced by (a) the responsibility
ascribed to others to conserve energy, (b) the actions others are
seen to be taking and, (c) incidences in which other agents' re-
sponsibility to conserve energy falls short of their perceived eco-
actions.ology, University of Essex,
chanan), rrusso@essex.ac.uk
Ltd. This is an open access article u1.1. The inﬂuence of other organizations on individual
environmental efforts
We propose that people's actions are inﬂuenced by collective
dynamics, such that individuals look to others (including larger
organizations) when setting their own behavior standards. We
suggest this on the basis that people do not operate in a social and
political vacuum; rather they are aware that other organizations
and entities have a role to play in energy conservation. Indeed, in
several qualitative studies it has emerged that people consider a
number of organizations to be responsible for environmental ef-
forts (Barr, Gilg, & Shaw, 2011; Hargreaves, Nye, & Burgess., 2013;
Hinchlifffe, 1996; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007).
Interestingly, such ﬁndings emerged despite the fact that the ma-
jority of these qualitative studies did not seek to examine the role of
other agents in environmental behaviors - which suggests that such
perceptions may be pervasive. Moreover, it is likely that these
perceptions are fostered by the media which frequently provides
commentary on the environmental efforts of a variety of agents and
institutions. For example, in April 2014 the UK was hit by high
levels of air pollution caused by a combination of local emissions,
light winds, pollution from the continent, and dust from the Sahara.
News articles were quick to acknowledge that such pollution could
bring further attention to the, “government's long-term failure to
reduce air pollution” (BBC, 2014). As such it is clear that a person'snder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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that need to be taken into consideration (see also Catney et al.,
2013).1.2. Responsibility
The link between personal responsibility and willingness to
enact or support ECB has been established in a multitude of
research studies (e.g., Guagnano, Dietz, & Stern, 1994; Hines,
Hungerford, & Tomara, 1987; Hunecke, Blobaum, Matthies, &
Hoger, 2001; Jansson, Marell, & Nordlund, 2010; Kaiser, Ranney,
Hartig, & Bowler, 1999; Kaiser & Shimoda, 1999; Nordlund &
Garvill, 2002; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005). In contrast,
far less is known about the relationship between ascriptions of
environmental responsibility to other agents and personal will-
ingness to enact ECB. Yet, it is apparent from both quantitative and
qualitative studies, that individuals are aware that other agents,
such as their neighbours, the government, corporate bodies (e.g.,
city council, ofﬁces) and multinationals, have a role to play in en-
ergy conservation (e.g., Hargreaves, Nye, & Burgess, 2010;
Hinchliffe, 1996; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Stern, Dietz, & Black,
1985). However, it remains to be seen how these perceptions of
others' environmental obligations inﬂuence people's own envi-
ronmental efforts. According to the bystander effect, we might
expect a diffusion of responsibility to occur and individuals to be
less inclined to help by enacting ECB when responsibility is
distributed among several others (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane &
Darley, 1970; Latane & Nida, 1981). Yet, on the other hand, if in-
dividuals consider both themselves and others responsible for en-
ergy conservation this may foster a sense of shared responsibility,
such that willingness to enact ECB is positively inﬂuenced by as-
criptions of responsibility to others.1.3. Action
Past research suggests that social norms play a pervasive role in
an individual's willingness to enact ECB (e.g., Barr et al., 2011;
Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990, Goldstein, Cialdini, &
Griskevicius, 2008; McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013; Nolan,
Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008; Schultz, Nolan,
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). Typically, marketing
campaigns use social norms to try and inﬂuence people's behaviors
by changing perceptions of what is considered normal (descriptive
norms) or socially acceptable (injunctive norms). For instance, re-
searchers found that hotel guests were signiﬁcantly more likely to
re-use their towels when presented with the following normative
appeal, “Join your fellow guests in helping to save the environ-
ment”, than when presented with the message, “Help save the
environment” (Goldstein et al., 2008). Social norms can also lead
people to act in ways that are detrimental to the environment. For
example, people are more likely to litter in littered environments,
and this effect is even more pronounced if they have witnessed
another person drop litter (Cialdini et al., 1990 Experiment 1). As
such, there is substantial support for the idea that people may enact
either more or less ECB depending on what others are (or are not)
doing. However, typically norms have been examined at the indi-
vidual level and, to the best of our knowledge; there is currently no
research that examines if the norms of larger social organizations
(e.g., the government, energy suppliers) inﬂuence personal envi-
ronmental efforts. On the one hand, the environmental actions that
an organization takes (or does not take) may set an important
precedent (i.e., it may act as a norm), especially given the position of
power these organizations may hold. Yet, on the other hand, people
may not consider the actions of larger organizations as relevant ifthey perceive that they are operating on a substantially different
level from themselves.
1.4. Considering responsibility and action together
We propose that in order to understand if the wider social
context contributes to intentions to enact eco-behaviors it is
necessary to consider both perceptions of others' eco-
responsibilities, and others' eco-actions. This is because while re-
sponsibility and action are distinct and separable from one another
they are also clearly related. This relation stems from their deﬁni-
tion. Speciﬁcally, responsibility is deﬁned as, “the state or fact of
having a duty to deal with something…”, while action is deﬁned as,
“the fact or process of doing something”. In other words, re-
sponsibility is about “what we ought to be doing” whereas action is
about “what we are actually doing”. Thus when people think about
responsibility it is likely that they also consider action. Of course,
this does not mean that the two inevitably co-occur in an applied
setting. Rather, it is possible to be responsible for something but not
to take action and vice versa. However, given the operational links
between responsibility and action there are two good reasons for
considering the dual inﬂuence of both factors on intentions to enact
ECB. First, considering actionwithout responsibility may render the
inﬂuence of action irrelevant. If an agent is not considered
responsible for conserving energy then their actions or inactions
are irrelevant and may have little bearing on our own actions.
Second, considering action alongside responsibility provides the
basis for moral judgements to be made about whether other agents
are meeting their environmental responsibilities. As such, consid-
ering both responsibility and action together enables us to address
an important and hitherto unanswered research question: to what
extent are others' actions seen as matching their responsibility and
in cases where others' action are perceived as falling short of their
responsibility howdoes this inﬂuence personal willingness to enact
ECB? In the present paper we refrain from making speciﬁc pre-
dictions about whether perceptions of others' shortfall will lead to
either an increase or decrease inwillingness to enact ECB.We argue
that to do so would be inappropriate given that there are psycho-
logical mechanisms that can be used to infer support for either
possibility. Speciﬁcally, when confronted with others' shortfall, the
sucker effect and feelings of personal inefﬁcacy may explain why
people will decrease their efforts; whereas social compensation
theory may explain why people will increase their efforts.
1.4.1. Doing less: running a mile
The ‘sucker effect’ describes a phenomenon that occurs when
individuals experience motivation loss when they suspect that
capable others are not contributing (Kerr, 1983). There is some
indication from qualitative studies that the sucker effect may occur
in response to perceptions that powerful organizations are failing
to meet their environmental responsibilities (Barr et al., 2011;
Hinchliffe, 1996). For example, one interviewee observed, “But it
is discouraging when you hear … that places like America won't
sign up to the Kyoto agreement … That's just pushing us into
thinking, ‘well, why should we bother?’” (Barr et al., 2011, p.716),
while another interviewee commented, “I am one person and you
think, well why am I going to change my lifestyle if all these other
people aren't? It's human nature” (Lorenzoni et al., 2007, p.451).
Diminished feelings of personal efﬁcacy or perceived helpless-
ness may also lead individuals to do less when others' actions fall
short of their responsibility. Personal efﬁcacy refers to “the belief in
one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action
required to manage prospective situations.” (Bandura, 1995, p.2).
We suggest that individuals' personal efﬁcacy may be undermined
in the face of powerful global entities failing to live up to their
1 Past research suggests that the data obtained from M-turk is at least as reliable
as the data obtained via traditional methods, and reﬂect a more diverse sample
than either internet or college student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling,
2011; Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Rand, 2012).
Moreover researchers have replicated experimental studies previously conducted
using both convenience and nationally representative samples and have found that
the estimated average treatment effects are similar in the M Turk and in the original
samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). In the present research, appropriate
measures were taken to ensure that the data were of acceptable standard. Specif-
ically, we prevented respondents from taking the questionnaire more than once
and attention checks were included where participants were instructed to select a
particular option (e.g., please select the middle option to show you are paying
attention).
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this in qualitative research: “I'm impotent in a way because
America didn't sign up to the Kyoto agreement” (Lorenzoni et al.,
2007, p.450) and in quantitative research ﬁndings that show
perceived behavioral control is a strong predictor of environmental
behaviors (e.g., Heath & Gifford, 2002; Kaiser & Gutscher, 2003).
1.4.2. Doing more: going the extra green mile
Social compensation theory (SCT) proposes that in a collective
setting people may work harder or contribute more effort to group
tasks to compensate for others when they expect their co-workers
to perform poorly on a meaningful task (Williams & Karau, 1991).
As such, if extrapolated from a small group context (where SCT has
previously been studied) to a more societal context, SCT provides a
theoretical basis for why people may be more likely to increase
their own environmental efforts if they perceive a discrepancy
between others' actions and their responsibility. Notably, for social
compensation to occur in an environmental setting three condi-
tions need to be met. First, individuals would need to attribute
responsibility for energy conservation both to other agents and to
oneself to ensure energy conservation is considered an important
shared goal. Second, participants would need to perceive that the
actions others were taking to conserve energy were minimal or
ineffective. Third, as social compensation theory is grounded in the
collective effort model (Karau &Williams, 1993), individuals would
need to perceive that their environmental efforts could make at
least some difference to the goal of energy conservation.
2. Current research
In Studies 1 and 2 we utilized a correlational design to examine
if willingness to enact ECB were associated with perceptions of
others environmental responsibilities, actions, and the discrep-
ancies between others responsibility and actions. In Study 3, we
employed an experimental design and manipulated the extent to
which the government's actions were seen as falling short of their
responsibility to examine the effects on willingness to enact ECB.
3. Correlational studies: studies 1 and 2
In both Studies 1 and 2, we administered a questionnaire
measuring participants' willingness to enact ECB, perceptions of
others responsibility, actions, and the discrepancies between others
responsibility and actions (i.e., the shortfall). In Study 1, shortfall
was calculated by subtracting actions scores from responsibility
scores. In Study 2 we aimed to replicate the results obtained in
Study 1 and to extend the ﬁndings from Study 1, by administering
measures of shortfall to ensure that the results we obtained were
not the product of measurement biases.
3.1. Procedure
In Study 1, participants were presented with a list of six agents
displayed in a randomized order and were asked to rate the extent
towhich each agent was responsible for conserving energy andwas
taking action to conserve energy. We presented these rating tasks
to participants on two different pages because we aimed to avoid
highlighting any discrepancies between others' eco-responsibility
and eco-actions (i.e., others' shortfall) lest this affected ECB rat-
ings. Having completed the rating tasks, participants then indicated
their willingness to enact ECB. All measures are detailed below in
the order they were presented.
In Study 2, we followed the same procedure. However, this time
participants were randomly assigned to complete either (a) mea-
sures where shortfall was computed by subtracting action ratingsfrom responsibility ratings (as per Study 1) or (b) bipolar measures
of shortfall (ranging from “action is less than responsibility” to
“action is more than responsibility”). Participants then completed
the Environmental Government Judgement Scale (EGJS). This is a 15
item scale that we developed to measure perceptions that the
governments environmental actions were (i) less than, (ii) in line
with, or (iii) exceeding their responsibility. We developed and
included this measure to avoid relying on scales comprised of the
difference score calculated between two single items. After
completing the EGJS, participants then indicated their willingness
to enact ECB before providing their responses to a scenario where
governments' environmental actions were described as falling
short of their responsibility. We focused on the government, as
opposed to other organizations, because, in principle, the govern-
ment has the most control via legislation. In asking participants
explicitly for their responses to the shortfall scenario we were able
to see if their self-reported responses to shortfall would be in line
with the correlations between shortfall and willingness to enact
ECB.
3.2. Participants
In Studies 1 and 2 we recruited participants using a convenience
sampling method via Amazon's Mechanical Turk1 to respond to an
online survey entitled, “Social Issues and Your Opinions”. All par-
ticipants were USA citizens. In Study 1, a total of 197 participants
(103 males, 94 females) aged from 18 to 73 (M ¼ 33.32, SD ¼ 12.99)
completed the survey. In Study 2, 212 participants (128 males, 84
females), aged from 19 to 72 (M¼ 34.34, SD ¼ 11.98) completed the
survey. Of these 212 participants, 108 completed shortfall ratings by
providing action and responsibility ratings and 104 completed
judgements of the bipolar shortfall measures.
3.3. Measures
3.3.1. Responsibility and action judgements
Participants provided their own judgements about the extent to
which they agreed/disagreed that each of the six agents were (a)
responsible for conserving energy and (b) taking action to conserve
energy. All judgements were completed using 7-point scales from 1
(‘Strongly Disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly Agree’). The agents listed were:
myself, other consumers apart from me, the government, the en-
ergy suppliers, the big countries that use the most energy (here-
after referred to as industrial countries), and industrial factories.
We selected these 6 agents based on the ﬁndings from a pilot study
in which 10 participants (3 males, 7 females aged between 18 and
60,Mage ¼ 31, SD ¼ 12.27) responded to the open-ended question:
‘In your opinion who does the responsibility lie with to conserve
energy?’ We computed a mean score of ‘Other Agents’ Shortfall’
comprised of shortfall ratings of the following agents: the gov-
ernment, the energy suppliers, industrial factories and countries.
We excluded “other consumers” from this mean score because we
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more similar to themselves than to the other agents. In Study 1, we
always measured responsibility ﬁrst and action second. In Study 2,
we administered action ratings ﬁrst and responsibility ratings
second. In administering these measures in a different order we
aimed to rule out the possibility that our results were inﬂuenced by
ordering effects23.3.2. Shortfall judgements (subtracting action from responsibility)
Shortfall judgements were calculated by subtracting action
ratings from responsibility ratings. Hence, a positive ﬁgure in-
dicates a perception that the actions that others are taking to
conserve energy fall short of the responsibility that others have to
conserve energy.3.3.3. Shortfall judgements (a bipolar scale, Study 2 only)
In Study 2, half of the participants were randomly assigned to
complete shortfall judgements using a bipolar scale. Speciﬁcally,
theywere asked to indicate for each agent, ‘if the action they take to
conserve energy measures up to the responsibility they have to
conserve energy’ using a 13 point bipolar scale ranging from 6
(“action is less than responsibility”) to 6 (“action is more than re-
sponsibility”). The midpoint of 0 was labelled “action is equal to
responsibility”. We used a 13 point scale to ensure that results were
comparable with the shortfall scores that we obtained by sub-
tracting action ratings from responsibility ratings as this previous
method allowed scores to range 6 and 6. In subsequent analyses,
we reverse scored all responses so that a positive score equated to
more shortfall.Table 1
Studies 1 and 2: Means, standard deviations (SD), and standard error (SE) of re-




Mean SD SE Mean SD SE Mean SD SE3.3.4. The Environmental Government Judgement Scale (EGJS, Study
2 only)
In Study 2, we developed our own measure to assess the rela-
tionship between perceptions of government's responsibility to
conserve energy and perceptions of the government's energy
conservation actions. Logic dictates that there are only three
possible relationships between these two variables. Accordingly,
we generated a pool of statements intended to reﬂect beliefs that
the government's actions (i) fell short of its responsibility, (ii) were
in line with its responsibility, and (iii) exceeded its responsibility. In
total we generated 15 statements, 5 for each of the possible three
relationships. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement/
disagreement with each statement using a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (‘Strongly Disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly Agree’). All items are
listed below in the results section in Table 3.Study 1:
Me 5.45 1.28 .09 5.21 1.35 .09 .24 1.32 .09
Other consumers 5.32 1.25 .09 4.47 1.36 .10 .86 1.70 .12
Other Agents 5.74 1.07 .07 3.85 1.47 .10 1.89 1.81 .13
Government 5.72 1.30 .09 4.09 1.60 .11 1.63 1.94 .14
Countries 5.85 1.27 .09 3.72 1.73 .12 2.13 2.14 .15
Suppliers 5.71 1.27 .09 3.94 1.66 .12 1.77 1.99 .14
Factories 5.85 1.24 .09 3.65 1.74 .12 2.20 2.15 .15
Study 2:
Me 5.61 1.31 .13 5.17 1.39 .13 .43 1.23 .12
Other consumers 5.52 1.38 .13 4.65 1.17 .11 .87 1.59 .15
Other Agents 5.69 1.16 .11 3.90 1.15 .11 2.01 1.73 .17
Government 5.72 1.38 .13 4.07 1.50 .14 1.65 1.73 .173.3.5. Government shortfall scenario (Study 2 only)
We asked participants to report what they would do if the
government's action to conserve energy fell short of its environ-
mental responsibility. Responses were made using a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (‘Decrease my environmental efforts a lot’) to 5
(‘Increase my environmental efforts a lot’). The midpoint of the
scale (i.e., 3) represented ‘make no change to my environmental
efforts’. Participants were then asked to provide qualitative expla-
nations for the answer they had given.2 Speciﬁcally, it is possible that our ﬁndings in Study 1 may have been swayed by
the order in which we measured action and responsibility ratings as we always
measured responsibility ratings ﬁrst and action ratings second. This may have
affected shortfall ratings by anchoring them to responsibility ratings meaning that
participants' assessments of shortfall and its relationship to ECB could have been
primarily inﬂuenced by participants' perceptions of others responsibility.3.3.6. Willingness to enact ECB
In both Studies 1 and 2, participants indicated the likelihood
that they would make a concerted effort to enact each ECB using a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). Six
out of eight of these items were adapted from the Student Envi-
ronmental Behavior Scale (Markowitz, Goldberg, Ashton, & Lee,
2012, p.99). We avoided selecting items that may be dependent
on people's circumstances (e.g., the extent to which they have the
opportunities to use public transport, carpool, replace CFL light
bulbs, etc.) and instead focused on energy conservation behaviors
that in theory most people could enact. Both exploratory and
conﬁrmatory factor analysis performed on Studies 1 and 2 revealed
a two factor structure (see Supplementary Materials). Factor 1
consisted of items representing effortful ECB: ‘Donate money to
research projects designed to reduce carbon emissions’, ‘Start a
petition to support environmental protection efforts’ and ‘Tell
others about ways in which they can be environmentally friendly’.
Factor 2 consisted of items representing easier ECB: ‘Turn my
thermostat down by one degree’, ‘Switch off lights in unoccupied
rooms’, and, ‘Avoid leaving electronic appliances in stand by
modes’. In both Studies 1 and 2 both subscales had good internal
reliability (Study 1: Easy: a ¼ .74, Effortful: a ¼ .76. Study 2: Easy:
a ¼ .70, Effortful: a ¼ .80) and were signiﬁcantly positively corre-
lated (Study 1: r¼ .44, p < .01, Study 2: r¼ .62, p < .01).
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Responsibility and action and shortfall judgements
Means, standard deviations, and standard errors indicating re-
spondents' perceptions of each agent's responsibility to conserve
energy and the actions each agent is perceived to be taking to
conserve energy are shown in Table 1.
3.4.2. Responsibility ratings
In both Studies 1 and 2, respondents' responsibility ratings
indicate that each of the agents is perceived to be at least somewhat
responsible for conserving energy (means ranged from 5 to 6).
Overall, participants tended to rate their own responsibility toCountries 5.89 1.37 .13 3.50 1.69 .16 2.39 2.24 .21
Suppliers 5.70 1.37 .13 3.98 1.68 .16 1.72 1.95 .19
Factories 5.64 1.56 .15 3.34 1.58 .15 2.30 2.06 .20
Note. The ‘other agents’ score is comprised of the mean of the ratings given for
government, industrial countries, the energy suppliers and industrial factories. In
Study 1, N ¼ 212. In Study 2: N ¼ 108. In Study 1 we always measured responsibility
ratings ﬁrst and action ratings second. In Study 2, we did the reverse (i.e., always
measured action ratings ﬁrst and responsibility ratings second).
Table 2
Study 2: The Means, Standard Deviations (SD), and Standard Error (SE) of the Bipolar
Shortfall Measure and ﬁndings from the one sample T-test.
Shortfall One sample T-test (comparison to 0)
Mean SD SE
Me .24 2.29 .22 t(103) ¼ 1.07, NS, CI: .68 to .20.
Other consumers .67 2.10 .21 t(103) ¼ 3.27, p < .01, CI: .26 to 1.08.
Other Agents 1.21 3.00 .29 t(103) ¼ 4.09, p < .01, CI: .63 to 1.79.
Government .78 3.42 .34 t(103) ¼ 2.32, p < .05, CI: .11 to 1.44.
Countries 1.39 3.62 .35 t(103) ¼ 3.92, p < .01, CI: .69 to 2.10.
Suppliers 1.01 3.11 .31 t(103) ¼ 3.34, p < .01, CI: .41 to 1.62.
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examine if these differences were statistically signiﬁcant, we con-
ducted a series of pairwise comparisons where the signiﬁcance
level adopted for the results was adjusted to .01 to control for the
Familywise error rate.
In Study 1, the results showed that participants rated their own
responsibility for conserving energy as signiﬁcantly less than other
agents' responsibility, although the effect sizes obtained were small
(the government: t(196) ¼ 2.77, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ .46 to .08,
d ¼ 0.20, industrial countries t(196) ¼ 4.25, p < .01, CI ¼ 0.58
to 0.21, d ¼ 0.31, energy suppliers: t(196) ¼ 2.44, p < .01, 95%
CI ¼ 0.47 to0.05, d ¼ 0.20, industrial factories: t(196) ¼ 3.87,
p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.60 to 0.19, d ¼ 0.32, and other individual
consumers: t(196) ¼ 1.90, NS, 95% CI ¼ 0.02 to 0.39, d ¼ 0.11)3 In
Study 2, participants again tended to rate their own responsibility
as slightly less than other agents' responsibility, although these
differences were not large enough to reach signiﬁcance and the
effect sizes were negligible (the government: t(107)¼ 79, NS, 95%
CI ¼ 0.42 to 0.18, d ¼ 0.08, industrial countries t(107) ¼ 1.91,
NS, 95% CI ¼ 0.58 to 0.01, d ¼ 0.21, energy suppliers:
t(107) ¼ 0.71, NS, 95% CI ¼ 0.39 to 0.18, d ¼ 0.07, industrial
factories: t(107) ¼ .24, NS, 95% CI ¼ 0.34 to 0.27, d ¼ 0.02 and
other individual consumers: t(107)¼ 1.31, NS, 95% CI¼.04 to 0.21,
d ¼ 0.07).
Perceptions of other agents' responsibility did not appear to
diminish participants judgements of their own responsibility, in
fact the more participants felt other agents were responsible the
more they also felt they too were responsible (Study 1: r ¼ .57 and
Study 2: r ¼ .55, both ps < .01).
3.4.3. Action ratings
In both Studies 1 and 2, the data show that participants were
less inclined to agree that other agents are taking action to conserve
energy with mean ratings for each agent typically falling between 3
and 4. This was with the exception of respondents own actions for
which the mean score was higher at 5.21 in Study 1, and 5.17 in
Study 2.
This suggests that participants believe they are taking at least
some action to conserve energy and that the action they are taking
is more than that of both other individual consumers and other
agents (Study 1: other individual consumers: t(196) ¼ 7.84, p < .01,
95% CI ¼ 0.56 to 0.94, d ¼ .54, d ¼ 0.75, the government:
t(196) ¼ 8.37, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.86 to 1.38, d ¼ 0.75, industrial
countries: (t(196) ¼ 10.75, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.23 to 1.77, d ¼ 0.96,
energy suppliers: t(196) ¼ 8.84, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.99 to 1.55,
d ¼ 0.84, and industrial factories: t(196) ¼ 11.09, p < .01, 95%
CI ¼ 1.28 to 1.84, d ¼ 1.00). Study 2: other individual consumers:
t(107)¼ 3.72, p < .01, 95% CI¼ 0.24 to .79, d¼ 0.41, the government:
t(107) ¼ 5.43, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.69 to 1.49, d ¼ 0.76, industrial
countries: (t(107) ¼ 7.95, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.25 to 2.08, d ¼ 1.08,
energy suppliers: t(107) ¼ 5.99, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.79 to 1.57,
d ¼ 0.77 and, industrial factories: t(107) ¼ 9.27, p < .01, 95%
CI ¼ 1.43 to 2.21, d ¼ 1.23)).
3.4.4. Shortfall ratings: responsibility minus action
There were signiﬁcant differences between each of the agents'
eco responsibility ratings and their corresponding eco-actions, such
that others' eco-actions fell short of their responsibility (other in-
dividual consumers: t(196) ¼ 7.07, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ .62 to .1.10,
d ¼ .65, the government: t(196) ¼ 11.80, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.35 to
1.90, d ¼ 0.65, industrial countries: (t(196) ¼ 13.96, p < .01, 95%3 Notably, as the dependent variable in question could be viewed as ordinal we
also ran the equivalent non parametric tests and obtained comparable results.CI ¼ 1.83 to 2.43, d ¼ 1.40, energy suppliers: t(196) ¼ 12.47, p < .01,
95% CI ¼ 1.48 to 2.05, d ¼ 1.19, and industrial factories:
t(196)¼ 14.35, p < 01, 95% CI¼ 1.90 to 2.50, d¼ 1.45). Study 2: other
individual consumers: t(107) ¼ 5.67, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.56 to .1.18,
d ¼ 0.68, the government: t(107) ¼ 9.89, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.32 to
1.98, d ¼ 1.12, industrial countries: (t(107) ¼ 11.07, p < .01, 95%
CI ¼ 1.97 to 2.82, d ¼ 1.55, energy suppliers: t(107) ¼ 9.17, p < .01,
95% CI ¼ 1.35 to 2.09, d ¼ 1.12, and industrial factories:
t(107) ¼ 11.55, p < 01, 95% CI ¼ 1.91 to 2.69, d ¼ 1.46)).
Interestingly, participants perceived even their own eco-actions
as falling short of their eco-responsibility (Study 1: t(196) ¼ 2.54,
p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.05 to 0.42, d ¼ 0.18, Study 2: (t(107) ¼ 3.67,
p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.20 to 0.67, d ¼ 0.32)). Nonetheless, participants
own shortfall was still seen to be signiﬁcantly smaller than others'
shortfall (Study 1: other individual consumers: t(196) ¼ 5.96,
p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 0.82 to 0.42, d ¼ 0.41, the government:
t(196) ¼ 10.05, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.66 to 1.11, d ¼ 0.84, in-
dustrial countries: (t(196) ¼ 12.65, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 2.19
to 1.59, d ¼ 1.06, energy suppliers: t(196) ¼ 10.41, p < .01, 95%
CI ¼ 1.82 to 1.23, d ¼ 0.91, and industrial factories:
t(196) ¼ 12.70, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 2.26 to 1.65, d ¼ 1.10). Study
2: other individual consumers: t(107) ¼ 3.09, p < .01, 95%
CI ¼ .72 to 0.16, d ¼ 0.31, the government: t(107) ¼ 5.91,
p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.61 to .81, d ¼ 0.81, industrial countries:
(t(107)¼ 8.48, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 2.41 to1.49, d ¼ 1.08, energy
suppliers: t(107)¼6.04, p < .01, 95% CI¼1.71 to.87, d¼0.89,
and industrial factories: t(107) ¼ 9.01, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 2.27
to .87, d ¼ 1.10)).
3.4.5. Shortfall ratings (a bipolar scale, Study 2 only)
The descriptive statistics for the shortfall ratings obtained using
the bipolar measure are listed in Table 2 along with the results
obtained from the series of one-sample t-tests which we conducted
for each agent to examine if their shortfall scores were signiﬁcantly
different from 0.
The ﬁndings show that each of the other agents' eco-actions is
perceived to fall signiﬁcantly short of their eco-responsibility (apart
from Government that did not reach the Familywise corrected .01
signiﬁcance level). In contrast, participants tended to report that
their own eco-actions were either in line with, or marginally sur-
passed their eco-responsibility. Respondents own shortfall was
rated as signiﬁcantly smaller than each of the others' shortfall
(other consumers: t(103) ¼ 3.43, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.41 to 0.38,
d ¼ 0.41, government: t(103) ¼ 2.50, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.83
to 0.21, d ¼ 0.35, industrial countries: t(103) ¼ 3.95, p < .01,
95% CI ¼ 2.45 to 0.81, d ¼ 0.54, energy suppliers:
t(103) ¼ 3.53, p < .01, 95% CI ¼ 1.97 to .0.55, d ¼ 0.46, and
industrial factories: t(103)¼4.78, p < .01, 95% CI¼2.65 to1.10,
d ¼ 0.65).Factories 1.64 3.38 .38 t(103) ¼ 4.94, p < .01, CI: .98 to 2.29.
Note. The ‘other agents’ score is comprised of the mean of the ratings given for
government, industrial countries, the energy suppliers and industrial factories.
N ¼ 104. The Familywise adjusted level of signiﬁcance is .01.
Table 3
Study 2: Exploratory factor analysis on environmental government judgement items using oblimin rotation.
Factor loading Communalities
Factor 1 Factor 2 Initial Extracted
The government is fulﬁlling its duty to take action to reduce carbon emissions. .95 .09 .78 .80
The government is doing exactly what it should to conserve energy. .91 .06 .75 .76
The government's environmental actions are in line with its environmental responsibility. .88 .08 .67 .70
The government has implemented enough action focused policies to be in line with its
responsibility to conserve energy.
.82 .05 .75 .73
The government is meeting its environmental obligations because it takes enough
actions to conserve energy.
.82 .04 .70 .71
The government is more than fulﬁlling its duty to take action to reduce carbon emissions. .79 .13 .78 .78
The government has implemented several action focused policies to do more than its
responsibility to conserve energy.
.78 .05 .57 .56
The government is exceeding its environmental obligations because it takes a multitude
of actions to conserve energy.
.66 .11 .60 .54
The governments' environmental actions exceed its environmental responsibility. .60 .30 .71 .68
The government is doing more than it should to conserve energy. .56 .32 .71 .65
To meet its environmental obligations the government needs to take more actions
to conserve energy.
.01 .80 .62 .66
The government needs to live up to its responsibility to conserve energy by implementing
more action focused policies.
.10 .70 .44 .40
The government's environmental actions fall short of its environmental responsibility. .24 .68 .72 .73
The government is doing less than it should to conserve energy. .32 .56 .66 .65
The government is not fulﬁlling its duty to take action to reduce carbon emissions. .34 .54 .71 .64
Note. Bold ﬁgures indicate which factor items predominantly loaded on.
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only)
To assess the structural integrity of the EGJS we ﬁrst conducted
parallel analysis (PA; Horn, 1965) using the SPSS syntax developed
by O'Connor (2000) to determine how many factors to extract.4
Previous studies have found that PA is one of the most accurate
methods for deciding how many factors to retain (e.g., Zwick &
Velicer, 1986). Only the ﬁrst two eigenvalues were greater than
the subsequent values, suggesting a two-factor structure solution.
Accordingly, we conducted exploratory factor analysis specifying a
two-factor solution. Given that we expected our subscales to be
negatively correlatedwe selected an oblimin rotation. Bartlett's test
(X02 (105) ¼ 2718.04, p < .01) suggested that there was an adequate
sample size for this analysis and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (.95) test
indicated that the data were suitable for factor analysis. The
eigenvalue for the ﬁrst factor was 9.31 and accounted for 62.07% of
the variance. The eigenvalue for the second factor was 1.41 and this
accounted for an additional 9.36% of the variance. All items loadings
are shown in Table 3.
Factor 1 is comprised of items representing the perception that
the government's action either in line with or exceeds its re-
sponsibility. Factor 2 is comprised only of items representing per-
ceptions that the government's environmental actions fall short of
its responsibility. Both subscales had acceptable reliability (Actions
in line with or exceeding responsibility: a ¼ .95, Shortfall: a ¼ .88).
As predicted, the two factors were signiﬁcantly negatively corre-
lated (r¼.37, p < .01). Moreover, there was some indication of
convergent validity as the government shortfall scale comprised of
5 itemswas signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the government
shortfall scale that we calculated by subtracting government action
from government responsibility (r ¼ .49, p < .01). Similarly, the
subscale containing items indicating government actions were
either in line with or exceeded its responsibility were signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with the government shortfall scale4 PA is based on the Monte Carlo simulation method and entails comparing
observed eigenvalues extracted from the correlation matrix to “expected” eigen-
values. “Expected” eigenvalues are computed by simulating random samples/
datasets that parallel the observed data in terms of sample size and number.comprised by subtracting government action from government
responsibility (r ¼ .49, p < .01).
We computed the means for each subscale and found that they
were in line with our previous ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, the mean score
for government shortfall was 5.22 (SD ¼ 1.16), indicating that re-
spondents perceive that the government's actions fall short of its
responsibility. Conversely, the mean score for the other subscale
was 2.89 (SD ¼ 1.16) indicating that the majority of participants do
not tend to believe that the government's actions are either in line
with or exceed its responsibility.
3.4.7. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to responsibility,
action, and shortfall
The Pearson productemoment correlation coefﬁcients between
participants' willingness to enact ECB and eco-responsibility and
eco-action ratings are shown in Table 4.
3.4.7.1. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to responsibility.
In both Studies 1 and 2, willingness to enact both easy and effortful
ECB was signiﬁcantly positively correlated with perceptions of
other agents as responsible for conserving energy (Study 1: rs
ranged from .15 to .38, with rs >.20 being signiﬁcant at p< .01. Study
2: rs ranged from .32 to .47, ps < .01).
3.4.7.2. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to action. Theextent
to which others agents were perceived to be taking action to
conserve energywas not consistently associatedwithwillingness to
enact either easyoreffortful ECB.Although, in Study2,we found that
both the ratings of government action and the ratings of industrial
factories actionwere negatively correlatedwithwillingness to enact
easy ECB, albeit these ﬁndings did not reach statistical signiﬁcance
after applying the Familywise corrected signiﬁcance level of .01).
3.4.7.3. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to shortfall (re-
sponsibility minus action). Overall the mean score of other agents'
shortfall (i.e., when their responsibility to conserve energy did not
measure up to their actions taken to conserve energy) was signif-
icantly positively correlated with willingness to enact easy (Study
1: r ¼ .26 and Study 2: r ¼ .38, both ps < .01) but not effortful ECB
(Study 1: r¼ .09 and Study 2: r¼ .16, both NS). In both Studies 1 and
Table 4
Studies 1 and 2: Pearson productemoment correlation coefﬁcients between each agent's responsibility, action and shortfall and intention to enact easy ECB and effortful ECB.
Behaviors Study Agents
Mys OthC OthA Gov Cou Sup Fac
Responsibility Easy 1 .31** .31** .35** .25** .38** .29** .33**
2 .52** .52** .49** .47** .35** .39** .32**
Effortful 1 .30** .21** .26** .25** .27** .15* .15*
2 .40** .42** .24* .18 .14 .10 .14
Action Easy 1 .44** .16* .04 .00 .01 .04 .08
2 .52** .14 .05 .08 .20* .05 .19*
Effortful 1 .40** .07 .09 .11 .14 .04 .04
2 .42** .22* .01 .04 .11 .06 .10
Shortfall (R e A) Easy 1 .15* .10 .26** .17* .23** .22** .26**
2 .03 .35** .38** .30** .37** .23* .39**
Effortful 1 .12 .09 .08 .07 .05 .06 .06
2 .06 .20* .16 .18 .16 .02 .18
Shortfall (Bipolar) Easy 2 .19 .06 .24* .18 .24** .14 .27**
Effortfu1 2 .29** .04 .04 .06 .06 .01 .04
Note: Mys ¼myself, OthC ¼ other consumers, OthA ¼ other agents (comprised of the mean of the ratings given for government, industrial countries, the energy suppliers and
industrial factories), Gov ¼ government, Cou ¼ industrial countries, Sup ¼ energy suppliers, Fac ¼ Industrial Factories. *p < .05, **p < .01. The Familywise adjusted level of
signiﬁcance is .01.
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energy suppliers, and factories were positively correlated with
willingness to enact easy, but not effortful, ECB. Further analyses
revealed positive correlations between each agent's shortfall and
willingness to enact easy ECB (Study 1: rs ranged from .17 to .26,
with rs >.20 being signiﬁcant at p < .01, Study 2: rs ranged from .23
to .39, with rs >.25 being signiﬁcant at p < .01).
We then conducted further analyses excluding anyone with a
score of 0 to see if this would inﬂuence the association of shortfall
ratings to willingness to enact ECB. Notably, those with a score of
0 believe that the agents' actions are in linewith their responsibility
(i.e., they are doing what they should be). However, the obtained
correlations were comparable to those displayed in Table 4.53.4.7.4. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to shortfall (bipolar
scale). The mean score of other agents' shortfall obtained using the
bipolar measure administered in Study 2 was also positively
correlated with willingness to enact easy, but not effortful, ECB
(r ¼ .24, p ¼ .016). Notably, this correlation was comparable to the
correlation we obtained between other agents' shortfall as
computed by subtracting action ratings from responsibility (Study
2: r¼ .24 vs. r¼ .38, Z¼ 1.12, NS). Further analyses revealed that the
correlations between each of the agents' shortfall and willingness
to enact easy ECB were positive (rs ranged from .14 to .27, albeit
only those greater than .25were signiﬁcant at the after applying the
Familywise corrected signiﬁcance level of .01).3.4.7.5. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to environmental
government judgement scale. The 5-item government shortfall scale
was signiﬁcantly positively correlated with willingness to enact
both easy and effortful ECB (respectively, rs ¼ .43 and .45, both
ps < .01). Conversely, the subscale comprised of items indicating
that government's actions were either in line with or in excess of its
responsibility was signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with willing-
ness to enact both easy and effortful ECB (respectively, rs ¼ .30
and .21, both ps < .01). Controlling for personal responsibility did
not substantially change the correlations between government
shortfall and willingness to enact either easy or effortful behaviors
(respectively, r(1056) ¼ .35 and .31, both ps < .01).5 Results available on request from the author.
6 Notably N is smaller because only half of the participants provided personal
responsibility ratings as they were randomly assigned to complete the shortfall
judgements where action ratings where deducted from responsibility ratings.3.4.8. Government shortfall scenario (Study 2 only)
The majority of participants reported that if the government's
actions fell short of its responsibility they would make no changes
to their environmental efforts (N ¼ 75, 35.4%), increase their efforts
a little (N ¼ 98, 46.2%) or a lot (N ¼ 37, 17.5%). Only 2 respondents
reported that they would decrease their efforts a little (N ¼ 1) or a
lot (N ¼ 1). Such ﬁndings replicate the positive correlations we
obtained between government shortfall and willingness to enact
ECB.
We used the qualitative responses participants gave for their
reactions to the government shortfall scenario to conduct thematic
analysis using the ﬁve step process outlined by Braun and Clarke
(2006) in which analysts (1) familiarize themselves with the data,
(2) code it, (3) generate initial themes, (4) review these themes, and
(5) deﬁne and name them. We employed an inductive approach
consistent with an essentialist/realist method whereby the themes
identiﬁed were strongly linked to the data. Hence, themes were
largely identiﬁed at the semantic level.
Table 5 shows the themes that emerged from our qualitative
analysis for people that indicated they would increase, decrease or
make no changes to their environmental efforts. The following
themes emerged for participants who said that theywould increase
their efforts either a little or a lot: compensation, obligation (per-
sonal and collective), efﬁcacy (personal and collective), importance
of the environment, moral high ground, and setting an example.
The following themes emerged for people who said they would
make no change: limits to personal environmental contribution,
belief that the environmental issues are not important, and
disconnection between personal actions and the government. Of
the two people who stated they would decrease their environ-
mental efforts, both questionedwhy they should domorewhen the
government was doing less. In other words, the sucker effect
appeared to account for these two people's decreased environ-
mental motivation.
3.5. Discussion
3.5.1. Perceptions of others' responsibility, actions, and shortfall
Studies 1 and 2 present a ﬁrst attempt to examine the wider
contextual associations of ECB. The results indicate that both in-
dividuals and other agents are perceived to be at least somewhat
responsible for conserving energy. Yet, other agents are seen to be
taking signiﬁcantly less action to conserve energy than individuals.
Both other agents and individuals' eco-actions are seen as falling
short of their responsibility to conserve energy and persisted
Table 5
Study 2: Thematic analysis on explanations for responses to the government shortfall scenario.
Theme Example item
Compensation (þ) ID 49: ‘To try and make up the shortfall’.
ID 58: “Because I would try to pick up the slack, even if it's just a little’.
Personal Obligation (þ) ID 24: “I have just as much of a personal obligation to be environmentally friendly as the government has”.
ID 88. “Because while I may not be responsible for the actions and decision of the government, I am responsible for these
things in my own life”.
Collective Obligation (þ) ID 43: “I think we all need to pitch in regardless of what the government does.”
ID 61: “It is our collective responsibility to care for the planet…”
Personal Efﬁcacy (þ) ID 3: “I would increase my environmental efforts because any effort to help the environment helps at least a little bit”.
ID 59: “Any little bit I can do to contribute can only help”.
Collective Efﬁcacy (þ) ID 30: “If everyone changed their efforts a lot it would make up for the short falls of the government”
ID 50: “If everyone increased their environmental efforts, it would make a big impact overall.”
Importance of environment (þ) ID 16: “I realize the human race is plaguing the Earth with pollution and harming the environment, and if we don't change
our ways, we may not have much longer, as a species, to survive on this planet.”
ID 32. “It is important to remember people will be living after we have gone and we need to leave the planet in a decent
state for them.”
Moral High Ground (þ) ID 22: “Just because the government proves incapable and incompetent doesn't mean I should as well”.
ID 31: “I want to do what I can and hope that other people feel the same way. Even if the government is failing the future,
I don't want to be a part of that.”
Setting an example (þ) ID 97: “Every little bit can help, if I start to be a bit more environmentally friendly that may rub off on other people and so
on and so forth”.
ID 126. “I would try to set a good example for the immediate people around me to try and offset the shortcomings of the
government”.
Limits of environmental contribution (0) ID 162: “I'm already doing everything I need to.”
ID 173: “How could me shivering in a cold house possibly make up for the government failing to pass laws that will do
things like ensure every car on the road gets decent mileage?”
Unimportance of environment (0) ID 197: “I'm just not sure, the environment seems ﬁne to me”.
ID 202: “I do not believe the dire predictions about the environment, and I do not think it is worth my time to make any
effort either way”.
Disconnection between personal actions and
the government (0)
ID 177: “My actions have very little to do with what the government is doing. If they increased or decreased, my personal
actions wouldn't change”
ID 203: “What the government does has no effect on how I act individually”.
Sucker effect () ID 211: Because why should I do more if they are doing less
ID212: Why should I bother reducing my living standards if my government can't make any positive changes?
Note. þ Increase in environmental efforts, 0 ¼ no change to environmental efforts,  ¼ decrease in environmental efforts.
K. Buchanan, R. Russo / Journal of Environmental Psychology 42 (2015) 82e93 89irrespective of whether we measured responsibility ﬁrst (as in
Study 1) or action ﬁrst (as in Study 2). Moreover, we consistently
found that regardless of which measures of shortfall are employed
there is still a perception that other agents actions are falling short
of their responsibility. Notably, this discrepancy between eco-
responsibility and eco-actions was signiﬁcantly larger for other
agents than for oneself.
3.5.2. Associations of willingness to enact ECB to responsibility,
action, and shortfall
Across both Studies 1 and 2 the data show that the responsibility
ascribed to others to conserve energy is associated with willingness
to enact both easy and effortful ECB. In contrast, perceptions of
others' eco-actions were not consistently and signiﬁcantly related
to either willingness to enact easy or effortful ECB. Interestingly,
when other agents' actions to conserve energy were seen as falling
short of their environmental responsibility, individuals were
somewhat more likely to report willingness to enact easy ECB.
3.5.3. Shortfall and willingness to enact ECB
Importantly, the positive association between shortfall and
willingness to enact ECB emerged consistently, despite our use of
several different measures of shortfall which included (i) sub-
tracting action ratings from responsibility ratings, (ii) using a bi-
polar scale (iii) measuring government shortfall using a 5 item
scale, and (iv) asking participants to respond to a government
shortfall scenario. As such, it seems that the ﬁndings are relatively
robust and are not vulnerable to differences in measurement style.
Moreover, a thematic analysis of the explanations revealed someinsight into why individuals may increase their efforts when con-
fronted with shortfall. Indeed, the themes that emerged were
compatible with the conditions needed to prompt social compen-
sation e i.e., that the goal to be obtained is both important and
shared, and that any personal actions they undertake will
contribute towards achieving the goal. Speciﬁcally, participants
appeared to consider “caring for the environment” to be an
important goal and one that they had a collective and personal
obligation to help fulﬁll. Moreover, they believed that the envi-
ronmental actions that they undertook could help make a
difference.
As such, the data provide some support for the idea that when
others' actions are seen to be falling short of their responsibility
people are more likely to be inclined to compensate for the
discrepancy by increasing their own willingness to enact ECB. Of
course, given that the magnitude of these correlations was gener-
ally small and only emerged between others' shortfall and will-
ingness to enact easy (but not effortful) ECB, it seems that
respondents may compensate for others' shortfall but only to a
certain extent.
4. An experimental study: Study 3
In both Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants appear
willing to compensate for other agents' shortfall by personally
enacting more easy to perform ECB. However, given the correla-
tional design of Studies 1 and 2 we cannot infer causality. Hence in
Study 3, we aimed to manipulate shortfall and examine the effect
on willingness to enact ECB. We manipulated shortfall by ﬁrst
7 We do not report the results of an ANOVA assessing the signiﬁcance of differ-
ences between these two means because of the procedure applied following the
median split division of scores.
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randomly assigning them to view either 10 government actions or
10 government inactions. Notably, we deliberately presented the
materials in this order in an attempt to manipulate shortfall. Spe-
ciﬁcally, by presenting participants with the responsibility rating
task ﬁrst and then showing them the actions/inactions we intended
to bring responsibility to the forefront of participants' minds. This
was done to ensure that those participants who subsequently
encountered the 10 government inactions perceived a shortfall to
occur between ascribed responsibility to the government and its
actions.
We manipulated action on the basis that in Studies 1 and 2
participants typically rated the government as at least somewhat
responsible for conserving energy (i.e., mean ratings were always
between 5 and 6 out of a maximum of 7). Given the stability of this
score we anticipated that it might be difﬁcult to manipulate par-
ticipants' responsibility perceptions. In contrast, we expected that
it might be easier to manipulate participants' perceptions of gov-
ernment's action as we suspect that only those with a specialist
interest in the environment would be familiar with environmental
policies and legislation. To manipulate actions we randomly
assigned participants to view either 10 environmental actions the
government has taken or 10 environmental actions the government
has not taken. We expected that participants in the inaction con-
dition would score more on the government shortfall measures.
Given the results of Studies 1 and 2 we hypothesized that par-
ticipants that were induced to perceive high levels of government
shortfall (i.e., in the inaction condition) would be signiﬁcantlymore
willing to enact ECB than participants that were induced to
perceive low levels of government shortfall (i.e., those in the action
condition). While we predicted that our experimental procedure
would manipulate participants' perceptions of government's
shortfall we also considered it likely that in each condition there
would be some people that were unaffected by themanipulation. In
order to maximize the effect of our manipulation, we removed
participants whose scores on our 5-item measure of government
shortfall were discordant to the manipulation condition they had
been allocated to, namely, (a) those participants who scored highly
on government shortfall in the action condition and, (b) those
participants who scored low on government shortfall in the inac-
tion condition. Further details on this procedure are presented in
the result section.
4.1. Procedure
Participants ﬁrst rated the extent to which they believed the
government is responsible for conserving energy. They were then
randomly assigned to view either 10 statements emphasizing the
action the government has taken to reduce carbon emissions/
greenhouse gases or 10 statements emphasizing issues where the
government has not taken action (see Appendix A). An example of a
government action was, ‘The environmental actions the govern-
ment has taken caused carbon pollution to fall to its lowest level in
nearly 20 years’ and an example of a comparable government
inactionwas, ‘Recent data found that energy related carbon dioxide
emissions in 2013were 2% above the 2012 level, largely because the
government has not implemented effective environmental
policies.’
Each statement was displayed on a single page and the order in
which the pages were presented was randomized. To ensure that
participants read the statements we instructed them to ‘read this
information carefully as you will be asked questions about it later’.
To check if our manipulation had worked we asked participants to
complete a measure of government action so that we could
compute shortfall by subtracting action ratings from responsibilityratings (as in Studies 1 and 2) as well as our 5-item government
shortfall judgement scale (as in Study 2). Finally, participants were
asked to indicate how willing they would be to engage in ECB.
4.2. Participants
A total of 125 participants (71 males, 54 females) were recruited
via Amazon's Mechanical Turk to complete the online question-
naire. All participants were USA citizens. Their ages ranged from 19
to 81 (M ¼ 3.76, SD ¼ 13.81). 63 participants were randomly allo-
cated to the high shortfall (government inaction) condition and 62
participants to the low shortfall (government action) condition.
4.3. Measures
4.3.1. Government shortfall
Wemeasured government shortfall using two methods. First, as
in Studies 1 and 2, we subtracted action ratings from government
ratings and second, as in Study 2, we administered the 5-item
measure of government shortfall. The 5-item measure of govern-
ment shortfall had excellent reliability (a ¼ .90).
4.3.2. Willingness to enact ECB
As in Studies 1 and 2 participants completed a measure of their
willingness to enact ECB. Each subscale had acceptable reliability
(easy: a ¼ .68, effortful: a ¼ .79).
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Manipulation checks
We expected that participants who were exposed to 10 gov-
ernment actions would rate government shortfall as low while
participants who were exposed to 10 government inactions would
rate government shortfall as high. To examine if this expectation
was correct we used a median split to categorize participants'
scores on the 5 item government shortfall scale as low (scores of 5
or less) or high (scores of 5.2 or more) to see whether the obtained
scores were discordant to the condition participants had been
allocated to (i.e. low shortfall scores to participants in the high
shortfall condition and high shortfall scores to participants in the
low shortfall condition). While this expectation held true for the
majority of participants (N ¼ 100), it seems that the manipulation
did notwork as intended for a ﬁfth of our sample. Speciﬁcally, in the
no-shortfall condition (i.e., where participants were shown 10
government actions) 12 participants still reported perceiving high
levels of government shortfall. In the shortfall condition (i.e., where
participants were shown 10 government inactions) 13 participants
did not report perceiving high levels of shortfall. Hence, following
the exclusion of these participants, the mean score of the 5-item
government shortfall was 6.14 (SD ¼ .55) in the shortfall (or inac-
tion) condition and 3.42 (SD ¼ .98) in the non-shortfall (or action)
condition7
As an additional test of our manipulation we conducted a one
way ANOVA to examine if the conditions had produced signiﬁ-
cantly different perceptions of government shortfall as assessed by
subtracting government action ratings from government re-
sponsibility ratings. As intended, there was a signiﬁcant effect of
condition on the Shortfall difference score: F (1, 98) ¼ 169.77,
p < .01. h2¼ .63) such that participants in the shortfall (or inaction)
condition scored higher on government shortfall measures than
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SD ¼ 1.73 vs. M ¼ .92, SD ¼ 1.55).
4.4.2. Effect of condition on willingness to enact ECB
Findings from two one-way ANOVAs revealed that there was a
signiﬁcant effect of condition onwillingness to enact both easy and
effortful ECB (respectively, F (1, 98)¼ 3.98, p < .05. h2¼ .04 and F (1,
98) ¼ 5.29, p < .02. h2 ¼ .05), such that those in the shortfall (or
inaction) condition reported more willingness to enact ECBs than
those in the non-shortfall (or action) condition (easy ECB:M¼ 5.97,
SD ¼ 0.96 vs.M ¼ 5.55, SD ¼ 1.15, effortful ECB:M ¼ 4.44, SD ¼ 1.46
vs. M ¼ 3.84, SD ¼ 1.11). These ﬁndings suggest that participants
may be more willing to enact ECB when they are induced to believe
that the government's environmental actions fall short of its
responsibility.
4.5. Study 3 discussion
The data from Study 3 demonstrate that it is possible to
manipulate shortfall by highlighting discrepancies between re-
sponsibility and action by ﬁrst having participants rate an agent's
responsibility and then varying the information participants have
about an agents actions. Our ﬁndings show that participants that
are induced to perceive high levels of government shortfall are
more willing to enact both easy and effortful ECB than participants
that perceive lower levels of government shortfall. Importantly the
data show the direction of causality between shortfall and will-
ingness to enact ECB.
5. General discussion
The present research presents a ﬁrst attempt to examine some
of the wider contextual variables that surround environmental is-
sues, namely, how perceptions of other agents' responsibility and
action contribute to individuals own environmental efforts. More-
over, by considering these variables in relation to one another we
were able to make a novel contribution to the literature regarding
how people react when others' eco-actions are seen as falling short
of their responsibilities.
In summary our ﬁndings show that several other agents are
seen as responsible for conserving energy but are not perceived as
taking action to do so. Respondents' willingness to enact ECB is
positively correlated with other agents' responsibility ratings but
not perception of their environmental actions. In circumstances
where others' actions are seen as falling short of their responsibility
people appear prepared to compensate for this shortfall by
increasing their willingness to enact ECB.
5.1. Willingness to enact ECB: why eco-responsibility matters
We replicated ﬁndings from past research showing that (a) in-
dividuals consider themselves to be responsible for conserving
energy, and (b) that this responsibility is positively associated with
willingness to enact ECB (e.g., Hines et al., 1987; Kaiser & Shimoda,
1999). Our ﬁndings also complement existing quantitative and
qualitative ﬁndings by showing that aside from themselves people
attribute responsibility to several other agents (e.g., Lorenzoni et al.,
2007; Hargreaves et al., 2010; Hinchliffe, 1996; Stern et al., 1985).
Beyond replicating past research, we found that judgements about
others eco-responsibilities are positively correlated with willing-
ness to enact ECB. These ﬁndings present an important contribu-
tion to the literature, as they suggest that, when it comes to
environmental issues, responsibility is shared but not diffused,
leaving people willing to enact ECB. Indeed, the correlations of .57
and .55 between personal responsibility and others' responsibilityobtained in both Studies 1 and 2 provide some support for the
notion of shared environmental responsibility.
5.2. Willingness to enact ECB: why others' eco-actions do not seem
to matter
In both Studies 1 and 2 our ﬁndings suggest that others are not
perceived as taking much action to conserve energy, and that
others' eco-actions are not signiﬁcantly associated with willingness
to enact ECB. Therefore, little support was provided for the effects
of social norms, at least when considering other agents in the form
of high-level institutions or organizations. Such results may be
explained by the fact that the average person may have relatively
little knowledge of the environmental actions' that organizations
are taking/not taking. Equally, people may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to clearly
envisage an entire organization's environmental actions rather
than a singular person's actions. Indeed, on average participants
neither agreed nor disagreed that others were taking action to
conserve energy, thus suggesting that they were unsure about their
responses. It is possible then that a positive correlation may have
been found between willingness to enact ECB and other agents
actions if respondents were more inclined to believe these other
agents were taking action to conserve energy either because they
had knowledge of such actions and/or could envisage them.
It is also possible that we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations
between other agents actions and willingness to enact ECBs
because the others agents were not considered by participants to be
similar to themselves. Indeed, appeals involving social norms
appear to be more effective when their content involves a more
similar referent group such as guests in this room rather than guests
in this hotel (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2008; Reese, Lowe, & Steffgen,
2013; but see Bohner & Schlüter, 2014; Study 1 for conﬂicting
results).
In summary the null relations between other organizations'
actions and willingness to enact ECB could be explained by at least
three factors e knowledge of others environmental actions; difﬁ-
culty of envisaging an organization's environmental actions; and
perceived similarity of the organizations to oneself. Future research
could independently manipulate these factors to establish if they
affect the inﬂuence of an organization's actions on individuals own
environmental efforts.
5.3. Willingness to enact ECB: when others' actions fall short of
their responsibility
In Study 1, we found that other agents' responsibility to
conserve energy was seen as falling short of their action and that
this shortfall was signiﬁcantly positively correlated with willing-
ness to enact easy to perform ECB. In Study 2, we replicated these
ﬁndings using several different measures of shortfall. Moreover,
correlations between shortfall and willingness to enact easy to
perform ECB were corroborated as almost two thirds of re-
spondents reported that they would increase their environmental
efforts should the government's actions fall short of its re-
sponsibility. Finally, in Study 3 participants who were manipulated
to experience high perceptions of government shortfall were more
willing to enact both easy and effortful ECB than participants who
were manipulated to experience low perceptions of government
shortfall.
We suggest these ﬁndings are best explained by social
compensation theory. Indeed, the three conditions necessary for
compensation to occur were present in our data sets. First, re-
spondents attributed responsibility to everyone including them-
selves, indicating that energy conservation is seen as a collective or
shared goal. Second, respondents appeared unconvinced that other
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low action ratings. Third, participants appeared to perceive that
their own efforts could go some way in compensating for other
shortfall. Indeed, in Study 2, the qualitative explanations provided
support for the conditions needed for social compensation to occur.
6. Conclusions and future directions
Past research has typically identiﬁed ways in which individuals
can be encouraged to enact ECB. However, it has done so without
taking into consideration individuals' perceptions of the “external”
world. Our ﬁndings show that it is important to consider the
broader social context as the extent to which other organizations'
actions were seen to fall short of their environmental responsibility
increased personal willingness to enact ECB. In our research, we
focused on one organization in particular e the government. We
consistently found that perceptions of the governments' shortfall
were related to increased willingness to enact ECB.
Notably, although signiﬁcant, in both Studies 1 and 2 many of
the correlations we obtained between others' shortfall and ECB
were small in magnitude. Similarly, in Study 3, manipulating
shortfall did inﬂuence ECB but the effect sizes obtained were me-
dium rather than large. This suggests that perceptions of others'
shortfall may only explain a small percentage of the variance in
willingness to enact ECB. However, this does not mean that our
ﬁndings are of little importance or interest. Rather, encouraging
people to act in environmentally friendly ways constitutes a com-
plex challenge involving a multitude of factors. Thus to identify an
additional and previously unconsidered factor still presents an
important step towards gaining a more complete understanding of
people's willingness to enact ECB.
Nonetheless, although the present research offers an important
and novel contribution there is ample scope for future research that
could improve upon and extend our ﬁndings. First, future correla-
tional research should counterbalance the order in which the
measures are presented to participants. While we varied the order
in which participants completed responsibility and action judge-
ments, in both Studies 1 and 2 we always measured ECB after
participants had completed the responsibility and action judge-
ments. While this enabled us to compare the ﬁndings from the
correlational studies to Study 3 (in which the experimental design
meant that we had no choice but to measure ECB after re-
sponsibility and action) it is important to establish whether this
ordering had a bearing on our results. Second, to ensure that the
results obtained here are not attributable to self-report biases,
future research should utilize an objective measure of ECB that
captures participants physically enacting a meaningful and
personally costly behavior. Given the vague information partici-
pants received about each study it is unlikely that they guessed the
aim of our research and inﬂuenced their answers accordingly.
Nonetheless, indicating a willingness to enact ECB is different from
actually enacting ECB and establishing a relationship between
shortfall and an objective measure of ECB would demonstrate
ecological validity. Third, while our results are in line with social
compensation theory it is likely that there are additional theories
that may also explain the relationship between shortfall and will-
ingness to enact ECB. Indeed, in Study 2 participants mentioned
several other reasons for increasing their efforts in response to
government shortfall including taking the moral high ground or
setting an example to others. Future research could examine the
validity of these explanations by operationalizing them and
establishing their role as mediator between others shortfall and
willingness to enact ECB. Finally, there is ample scope for further
research to explore the links between the public goods dilemma
and the ﬁndings we obtained. Indeed, there are some parallelsbetween both the public goods dilemma and the perception of
others' actions as falling short of their responsibility. Namely, in
both scenarios, in the absence of everyone involved working
together (i.e., co-operating) it is still in an individual's best interest
to contribute evenwhen others do not (i.e., they defect) because the
payoff is still greater than doing nothing at all. Considering our
ﬁndings in this vein may help illuminate other relevant research
questions. For instance, participants that initially co-operate in
public good games tend to reduce their contribution in subsequent
rounds when others repeatedly defect. Are the same ﬁndings likely
to occur in the shortfall scenario or will people continue to
compensate for “repeat offenders” shortfall?
In summary, while as an explanation of the outcome we favor
social compensation theory, undoubtedly further research may be
required to discount alternative theories. Nevertheless, the present
research indicates that perceived shortfall induces a willingness to
enact energy conservation behaviors.
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Appendix A
Government actions
The environmental actions the government has taken caused
carbon pollution to fall to its lowest level in nearly 20 years.
The government has recently established the toughest fuel
economy standards for passenger vehicles in US history.
The government has reduced oil imports by 10% - the equivalent
of 1 million barrels.
The government has ﬁnalized fuel economy standards for heavy
duty trucks, buses, and vans that will reduce greenhouse gases by
270 million metric tons.
Funds provided through a government initiative known as the
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) have enabled low-
income families to make their homes more energy efﬁcient,
saving them $400 per year.
The government has committed to increase funding for clean
energy technology by 30%.
The government has approved enough solar facilities to provide
electricity to power 4.4 million homes.
The government has successfully instigated the Better Buildings
Initiative which will help commercial and industrial buildings
become at least 20% more efﬁcient.
The government has recently implemented a range of incentives
for automakers to reduce greenhouse gases using effective design
solutions.
The government has committed to expand new and existing
international incentives including bilateral initiatives with China,
India, and other major emitting countries.
Government inactions
Recent data found that energy related carbon dioxide emissions
in 2013 were 2% above the 2012 level, largely because the gov-
ernment has not implemented effective environmental policies.
Without new action by the government, greenhouse gas emis-
sions (GHG) will increase over time and the government will fail to
meet its international commitment to reduce GHG emissions by17%
below 2005 levels by 2020.
The government has failed to take action to substantially reduce
hydroﬂurocarbon (HFC) reductions through implementing
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biggest opportunities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The government has failed to substantially reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation.
The government has neglected to establish carbon emissions
standards for both new and existing power plants, yet these are the
largest source of emission in the U.S., accounting for roughly 40% of
all domestic greenhouse gas pollution.
The government has not yet incentivized household energy ef-
ﬁciency using tax rebates.
The government has not provided substantial support for
climate resilient investments by removing policy barriers and
modernizing programs.
The government has failed toworkmore closely with the energy
industry to better manage supply and demand.
The government has not comprehensively assessed and
addressed existing and long-established energy efﬁciency barriers.
The government has overlooked energy waste in business and
factories by not introducing signiﬁcant incentives or carefully
considered energy reduction programs.Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
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